

**Title: Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms**

**Speaker: Prof. Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre**

**Area: Economics**

**Date: 20.07.2024, Venue: P21 @ 2.30 – 3.30 PM**

**Abstract:**

We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. We derive three new results for the identical objects model: (i) a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing, (ii) a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms, and (iii) a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms. We use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model.

**Speaker Profile:**



Webpage Link: <https://isi.irins.org/profile/122589>