Authors : Saptarshi Purkayastha, Rajaram Veliyath and Rejie George
Journal : : Journal of Business Research,153: 285-299
Year : 2022
Abstract
Dominant family control reduces Type I agency conflicts because of monitoring efficiencies while increasing Type II agency conflicts because of the family’s voting power. Additionally, Type II agency conflicts could be exacerbated if the family agents managed the firm solely for the family’s benefit. The two different types of agency conflicts were examined in a sample of 499 public Indian family businesses during the years 2006 to 2015. Family-controlled and non-family-managed firms appeared to be optimally configured to minimize both types of agency conflicts. The absence of management control appeared to alleviate some of the effects of the dissipative agency conflict on dominant family ownership.

Authors : Kshitij Awasthi K. and Rejie George
Journal : : Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 38: 1525–1559
Year : 2021
Abstract
One of the important roles which firm boards play is the resource provision role. In this study, we examine influence capital, a specific form of resource provision on boards. Two categories of government officials, i.e., Politicians and Bureaucrats tend to be the major providers of influence capital. While firm connections to politicians as board members has been examined in prior literature, connections to bureaucrats (and ex-bureaucrats) has not received the same level of attention. This is despite a sharp increase in the appointment of bureaucrats in company boards in the last few years. We analyze and provide evidence that industry regulation and foreign corporate ownership are major organizational determinants of selection of bureaucrats as board members. Further, it was also imperative to understand the differences in selection of various categories of bureaucrats as board members. We examined and find that generalist bureaucrats are more sought after by firms than specialist bureaucrats, usually as independent directors. Overall, this study provides an important initial thrust for studying bureaucrat board members as providers of influence capital.

Authors : Saptarshi Purkayastha, Rajaram Veliyath and Rejie George
Journal : : Journal of Business Research 98: 50-64
Year : 2019
Abstract
The study examined the interplay of the two separate governance dimensions of dominant ownership and management control that differentially affected the prevalence of Principal-Agent (PA) and Principal-Principal (PP) conflicts, as well as their respective impacts on shareholder value. The sample comprised of 675 Indian firms examined during the period 2006–2015. Dominant family ownership reduced the negative impacts of PA conflicts, while exacerbating the negative impacts of PP conflicts on shareholder value. However, when family ownership was combined with non-family management, the negative effects of PA conflicts were minimized, while creating a favorable impact of PP conflicts on shareholder value. Thus, the governance configuration that minimizes the undesirable impacts of both types of agency conflicts and is conducive to encouraging stewardship behaviors appears to be one where the influence of dominant (viz., family) owners is balanced by the executive decisions of non-family managers (officiating in their roles as stewards).

Authors : Chitra Singla, Rejie George and Rajaram Veliyath
Journal : : Journal of Business Research, 81: 130-143
Year : 2017
Abstract
We examine the longitudinal relationship between ownership structure and firm internationalization, in a sample of Indian firms. Drawing on principal-principal (PP) agency theory and the resource-based-view (RBV) of the firm, we argue that divergent preferences (motivations) of a firm's owners affect the firm's propensity to internationalize, while resource heterogeneity among these owners (owners' capability to access and provide resources) affects the firm's capability to internationalize. We argue that both motivation and capability are required for firms to pursue internationalization and that when either of these is missing in an owner, that owner's shareholding will be negatively associated with internationalization. Additionally, our results uncover an interesting dichotomy. While family owners with lower levels of ownership favor their firms' internationalization, they do not favor it at higher levels of ownership. Our results indicate that foreign owners appeared to adjust their roles to accommodate the preferences of the dominant family owners.

Authors : Anish Sugathan and Rejie George
Journal : : Rutgers Business Review, 2: 240-250
Year : 2017
Abstract
Profit shifting structures deployed for tax management by many multinational corporations have recently come under intense regulatory scrutiny and heated public debate around the world. At the heart of the debate is the fact that profit shifting can often lead to conflicting outcomes for societies, shareholders and managers — posing complex financial and ethical dilemmas. In a recently published paper we propose a conceptual framework of the underlying costs and incentives of profit shifting in a multi-stakeholder world. We analyze the pathways through which the quality of a country's macro-institutions and corporate governance jointly determine the eventual net-gains of profit shifting. We deliberate on the salient aspects of the paper from the perspective of decision makers — shareholders, managers, and policy makers.

Authors : A . S Ashwin, R.T Krishnan & Rejie George
Journal : : International Studies of Management and Organization, 46: 8-23
Year : 2016
Abstract
In this study, we examine how board characteristics, such as the independent director ratio, board size, and the number of interlocks, influence the investment of slack resources into research and development (R&D) by a firm. Both the agency theory and resource dependence theory predict a positive influence of independent director ratio on the financial slack-R&D investment relationship. However in the case of board size and number of interlocks, resource dependence theory argues for a positive moderating effect, while agency theory predicts a negative effect. The hypotheses are tested on the seven-year panel data of 172 firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, an emerging economy, high technology industry. We find broad support for the resource provisioning role of the board of directors, which is attributed to the emerging economy context of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, where firms face high levels of opportunity but lack resources to make use of them effectively.

Authors : Rajaram Veliyath, Rejie George, Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye, Dana R. Hermanson, James G. Tompkins
Journal : : Long Range Planning : Volume : 49: Pages : 519-539
Year : 2016
Abstract
This study examined the processes undertaken by compensation committees (CCs) on Indian public company boards building on the CC process study of U.S. public company boards reported in Hermanson et al. (2012). The Indian data reported here were gathered through scripted, in-depth, semi-structured interviews of 21 Indian directors (17 CC members, two Management Committee members and two directors, all of whom dealt with compensation matters on their boards).

Authors : Anish Sugathan and Rejie George
Journal : Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 8, pp. 886-916
Year : 2015
Abstract
In this article we develop a conceptual model to examine the influence of quality of country-level governance infrastructure and corporate governance effectiveness on profit shifting. We empirically test propositions derived from the model with a unique firm-level data set and using multiple indicators of governance infrastructure quality and corporate governance mechanisms.

Authors : Chitra Singla, Rajaram Veliyath and Rejie George
Journal : Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 35, Issue 4, P 606-616
Year : 2014
Abstract
This article documents that blockholders with both ownership and management control in family firms have different goals compared to blockholders with only ownership (but no management) control. We theorize and find evidence that family controlled and family managed (FCFM) firms negatively moderate the relationships between internationalization and governance mechanisms, while family controlled and nonfamily managed (FCNFM) firms do not.

Authors : Narayanaswamy R, Raghunandan K and Rama D V
Journal : Accounting Horizons, Accounting Horizons
Year : 2012
Abstract
We provide a brief overview of corporate governance in India, including a description of Indian contextual differences (as compared to the U.S. and elsewhere) and a discussion of the major events contributing to the evolution of India's corporate governance/accounting/auditing practices since economic deregulation in 1991.

Authors : Vasanthi Srinivasan
Journal : Journal of Business Ethics, 104(1), 73-81
Year : 2012
Abstract
This article attempts to understand the state of teaching, training and research in business ethics in the South and South East Asian region. The countries surveyed are Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam.

Authors : Vasanthi Srinivasan
Journal : Vikalpa, 37(2), 102-108
Year : 2012

Authors : Vasanthi Srinivasan
Journal : African Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 2, Dec. 2009, P 32-36
Year : 2006
Abstract
The extant literature on CSR and ethics suggests that there is a need for a greater understanding about SMEs. The role of SMEs in the economic growth and development of emerging countries like India is significant. Given the geographical diversity of India and its high reliance on agriculture, MSMEs (medium, small and micro enterprises) are the lifeline of economic development and growth in future.

Authors : S Raghunath
Journal : IIMB Management Review, Vol.9, Iss.1,57-66p.
Year : 1997
Abstract
Is the board of directors the heart and soul of a company as it should be, ideally, or merely an 'old boy's club' which rubber stamps decisions taken by the CEO? Can it be a meaningful instrument of corporate governance? Various aspects such as the creation and running of an effective board, the difference between directing and managing, the interface between the board and the CEO, including the public sector perspective on the issue have been discussed by academicians and senior corporate executives.