Research & Publications Office to host three seminars on 20 July featuring Indian Statistical Institute and Columbia University faculty
Topics include ‘Stable Matching with Privately Observed Payments’, ‘Managing Cascading Disruptions through Optimal Liability Assignment’ and ‘Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms’
16 July, 2024, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) at IIM Bangalore will host three research seminars, all on 20 July 2024 at Classroom P-21, the details of which are mentioned below.
Seminar 1 on ‘Stable Matching with Privately Observed Payments’, to be led by Prof. Anurava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre (Economics area), will be held from 10.30 am to 11.30 am.
Abstract: The research considers a variant of the Assignment Game model of Shapley and Shubi (1971) where the matching of workers and firms is commonly observed, but the division of surplus between a matched pair is privately observed only by the firm and the worker concerned. The researchers define and apply a stability notion in this setting based on the iterative elimination of blocked matching outcomes which captures the idea that, the absence of blocking pairs conveys no further information regarding the payoffs received by the other participants in the market. They show that the set of private payment stable matching outcomes always exists, the corresponding assignments are efficient in terms of maximizing total surplus, and the set is characterized by the worker optimal and firm optimal stable matching outcomes.
Webpage Link: https://isi.irins.org/profile/13369
Seminar 2 on ‘Managing Cascading Disruptions through Optimal Liability Assignment’, to be led by Prof. Jay Sethuraman, Columbia University (Economics area), will be held from 12 pm to 1 pm.
Abstract: The research describes a model in which agents on a chain make simultaneous preparatory investments to increase chances of honoring their respective bilateral agreements. Failures cascade: if one fails their agreement, then so do all who follow in the chain. Thus, later agents' investments turn out to be pointless when there is an earlier failure. How losses are shared affects how agents invest to avoid the losses in the first place. The discussion will characterize all efficient solutions: these have the form that later agents, who are not directly liable for the disruption, still shoulder some of the losses. Importantly, the research shows that such indirect liabilities are necessary to avoid unbounded inefficiencies.
Webpage Link: https://www.engineering.columbia.edu/faculty/Jay-Sethuraman
Seminar 3 on ‘Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms’, to be led by Prof. Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre (Economics area), will be held from 2.30 pm to 3.30 pm.
Abstract: The research shows that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values, is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. The researchers derive three new results for the identical objects model. First, a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing; second, a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms, and thirdly, a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms. The researchers use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model.
Webpage Link: https://isi.irins.org/profile/122589
Research & Publications Office to host three seminars on 20 July featuring Indian Statistical Institute and Columbia University faculty
Topics include ‘Stable Matching with Privately Observed Payments’, ‘Managing Cascading Disruptions through Optimal Liability Assignment’ and ‘Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms’
16 July, 2024, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) at IIM Bangalore will host three research seminars, all on 20 July 2024 at Classroom P-21, the details of which are mentioned below.
Seminar 1 on ‘Stable Matching with Privately Observed Payments’, to be led by Prof. Anurava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre (Economics area), will be held from 10.30 am to 11.30 am.
Abstract: The research considers a variant of the Assignment Game model of Shapley and Shubi (1971) where the matching of workers and firms is commonly observed, but the division of surplus between a matched pair is privately observed only by the firm and the worker concerned. The researchers define and apply a stability notion in this setting based on the iterative elimination of blocked matching outcomes which captures the idea that, the absence of blocking pairs conveys no further information regarding the payoffs received by the other participants in the market. They show that the set of private payment stable matching outcomes always exists, the corresponding assignments are efficient in terms of maximizing total surplus, and the set is characterized by the worker optimal and firm optimal stable matching outcomes.
Webpage Link: https://isi.irins.org/profile/13369
Seminar 2 on ‘Managing Cascading Disruptions through Optimal Liability Assignment’, to be led by Prof. Jay Sethuraman, Columbia University (Economics area), will be held from 12 pm to 1 pm.
Abstract: The research describes a model in which agents on a chain make simultaneous preparatory investments to increase chances of honoring their respective bilateral agreements. Failures cascade: if one fails their agreement, then so do all who follow in the chain. Thus, later agents' investments turn out to be pointless when there is an earlier failure. How losses are shared affects how agents invest to avoid the losses in the first place. The discussion will characterize all efficient solutions: these have the form that later agents, who are not directly liable for the disruption, still shoulder some of the losses. Importantly, the research shows that such indirect liabilities are necessary to avoid unbounded inefficiencies.
Webpage Link: https://www.engineering.columbia.edu/faculty/Jay-Sethuraman
Seminar 3 on ‘Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms’, to be led by Prof. Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre (Economics area), will be held from 2.30 pm to 3.30 pm.
Abstract: The research shows that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values, is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. The researchers derive three new results for the identical objects model. First, a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing; second, a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms, and thirdly, a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms. The researchers use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model.
Webpage Link: https://isi.irins.org/profile/122589