Research & Publications Office to host seminar on ‘Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents’ on 12 March
The talk will be delivered by Prof. Aditya Aradhye, Ashoka University
5 March, 2025, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) will host a seminar on, ‘Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents’, to be led by Prof. Aditya Aradhye, Ashoka University (Economics area), at 2.30 pm on 12th March 2025, at Classroom-P22.
Abstract: The researchers study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. Assuming individual rationality, the researchers completely characterize the spite-free mechanisms showing that they are a posted price threshold mechanism with an ordering on the players. Leveraging these findings, the researchers partially extend their analysis to a problem with multiple items and copies. Overall, these results illuminate the challenges of auctioning items in the natural presence of other-regarding preferences.
Speaker Profile: Dr. Aditya Aradhye is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Ashoka University. Before joining Ashoka University, he was a postdoctoral researcher at Tel Aviv University and Czech Technical University in Prague. He received his PhD in Quantitative Economics from the Maastricht University, the Netherlands.
He is interested in studying the strategic interaction between the fully informed and partially informed agents to understand the underlying information structures and the information transmission, particularly in settings such as Sender-Receiver Games, Bayesian Persuasion, etc. He is also interested in exploring the information structures that can arise in other models in Microeconomics such as Mechanism Design, Auctions, Congestion Games and Social Choice.
Webpage Link: https://www.ashoka.edu.in/profile/aditya-aradhye/
Research & Publications Office to host seminar on ‘Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents’ on 12 March
The talk will be delivered by Prof. Aditya Aradhye, Ashoka University
5 March, 2025, Bengaluru: The Office of Research and Publications (R&P) will host a seminar on, ‘Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents’, to be led by Prof. Aditya Aradhye, Ashoka University (Economics area), at 2.30 pm on 12th March 2025, at Classroom-P22.
Abstract: The researchers study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. Assuming individual rationality, the researchers completely characterize the spite-free mechanisms showing that they are a posted price threshold mechanism with an ordering on the players. Leveraging these findings, the researchers partially extend their analysis to a problem with multiple items and copies. Overall, these results illuminate the challenges of auctioning items in the natural presence of other-regarding preferences.
Speaker Profile: Dr. Aditya Aradhye is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Ashoka University. Before joining Ashoka University, he was a postdoctoral researcher at Tel Aviv University and Czech Technical University in Prague. He received his PhD in Quantitative Economics from the Maastricht University, the Netherlands.
He is interested in studying the strategic interaction between the fully informed and partially informed agents to understand the underlying information structures and the information transmission, particularly in settings such as Sender-Receiver Games, Bayesian Persuasion, etc. He is also interested in exploring the information structures that can arise in other models in Microeconomics such as Mechanism Design, Auctions, Congestion Games and Social Choice.
Webpage Link: https://www.ashoka.edu.in/profile/aditya-aradhye/